SCOTUS Recap - The ACA and Alvarez Decisions

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By James Bowden

On June 28, 2012, the last day of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 term, saw a surprising and important decision handed down in National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al., the challenge to the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”). While most of the news media was focused on the decision in the ACA challenge, the Supreme Court also issued an opinion in U.S. v. Alvarez on the same day overturning the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 in a decision likely to become a key piece of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.

I’m not going to attempt to provide incisive legal commentary on the ACA opinion - there is plenty of good commentary available with far more insight than I can muster, and frequent readers know that “incisive legal commentary” isn’t really what I do. I will go ahead and say that my predictions on the outcome of the ACA challenge were wrong.  Being wrong in my predictions puts me in good company, however - the decision surprised most court watchers. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Chief Justice joined what is commonly understood to be the more liberal members of the Court in upholding the majority of the ACA. The individual mandate, a key provision of the ACA which was the primary lightning rod for conservative criticism, was held constitutional under the federal government’s power to tax but not under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. Interestingly, in evaluating the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act heard in oral arguments, the Court held that the penalty for not purchasing insurance was not a “tax” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act; curious, considering the foothold found for the constitutionality of the individual mandate was held to be that the penalty was a permissible application of Congress’s power to tax. The portion of the opinion that most surprised me was the holding that the Medicaid expansion, which required states to abide by the increase in eligibility under Medicaid or lose all Medicaid funding, was unconstitutional as excessively coercive. A former professor of mine at Vanderbilt University Law School must be quite pleased with this holding - James Blumstein’s students should expect the subject matter to come up on future Constitutional Law II exams.

The opinion is really worth a read, even if it is a bit long, mostly because of the intended audience both the opinion and the dissent are clearly written for. Unlike many Supreme Court opinions, which focus on obscure and esoteric areas of law, the ACA opinion is written for consumption by the most novice of court watchers. The introduction to Chief Justice Robert’s opinion (and the corresponding dissent) cite opinions that first year law students (and even high school students taking classes on American Government) would be familiar: Marbury v. Madison, Gibbons v. Ogden and Wickard v. Filburn are all discussed. Waller’s very own Judge Alberto Gonzales was interviewed on America Live with Megyn Kelly, Morning Joe, and Anderson Cooper 360 regarding the opinion. Judge Gonzales was involved with vetting John Roberts when he was appointed to his current position by President Bush. Note to whoever does CNN’s webpage addresses - it is “Gonzales” with an “s.”

I’m a bit disappointed that the ACA ruling took the spotlight away from the decision in the Alvarez case. The respondent, Xavier Alvarez, kicked off his first meeting as a member of the Three Valley Water District in Claremont, California by telling the assembly that “Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.” It seems that Mr. Alvarez is quite the fabulist, and the statement that he had won the Congressional Medal of Honor, much like many of his other life stories (including that he had played for the Detroit Red Wings) was a lie. Unfortunately for Mr. Alvarez, under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005, lying about earning a Congressional Medal of Honor carries a penalty of not more than one year in prison.

I
n holding the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional, the Court provides a significant advancement of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The opinion distinguishes simple lies from statements that are not protected by the First Amendment, including fraud, “fighting words,” inciting violence, and defamation. There are a good number of quotes from this opinion worth remembering; the majority opinion even gives a nod to George Orwell:

“Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no clear limiting principal. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”

This is the core of the Alvarez opinion: that allowing the government to punish statements simply for the fact that they are false gives the government the power to determine what is true. It is also an excellent opinion for readers in an era, as mentioned above, in which Supreme Court opinions are too often inaccessible to most readers. Justice William O. Douglas would be proud. I think it is worth noting that the dissent filed in the case was written by Justice Alito, which is in keeping with his more restrictive views on the protections afforded by the First Amendment. Here are two more great quotes from the opinion in parting:

“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.” 

          and 

“The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.”

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Mr. Affordable Care Act Goes [Back] To Washington

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By James Bowden

The most eagle-eyed tourists visiting Washington D.C. for the 100th annual Cherry Blossom Festival might have noticed a line forming at One First Street. Starting on Friday of last week, court watchers and assorted activists took their place in line (or, alternatively, paid someone else to stand in line for them) for the opportunity to see oral arguments in the cases filed against the Affordable Care Act. They lined up early for a good reason; this case is effectively the Super Bowl of constitutional litigation, as the Supreme Court recognized when it allotted a nearly unprecedented six hours to oral arguments over three days.

The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed primarily at decreasing the rate at which U.S. spending on healthcare increases. It includes a host of regulatory schemes and pilot programs, including provisions implementing the concept of care delivery by 'Accountable Care Organizations,' banning healthcare insurers from excluding people because of preexisting conditions, banning the practice of rescission of health insurance by insurers except in cases of fraud, expanding Medicaid participation eligibility, creating health insurance 'exchanges' at the state level, and authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to developed bundled payment plans to alter the dynamics of the current fee-for-service model of payment for healthcare by third-party insurers. However, the most controversial provision by far (with the possible exception of a completely fictitious provision establishing 'death panels') is the so-called 'individual mandate,' which requires all adults, with certain exceptions, to carry a minimum level of health insurance or pay a penalty come tax time every year.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments on four issues from two cases from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the Affordable Care Act, specifically National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services. The first case, filed by the National Federation of Independent Business and two individual plaintiffs who cannot be bothered to carry health insurance and want everyone to know it, argues that the individual mandate is an unconstitutional exercise of federal power to regulate interstate commerce. The other case, filed by the Attorney General of Florida and joined by the Attorneys General of twenty five other states, also argues that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, and adds a claim that the Medicaid expansion is an unconstitutional exercise of coercive power by the federal government over the states. The four issues that the Supreme Court will be hearing are (i) whether the suits are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, (ii) whether the individual mandate is unconstitutional, (iii) whether the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional, and (iv) if either the individual mandate or the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional, whether they are severable from the Affordable Care Act or whether the Act in its entirety must be struck down.

The question regarding the Anti-Injunction Act is effectively a procedure question as to the ripeness of the suit. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits courts from hearing cases seeing to restrain the IRS from assessing a tax; in order to challenge a tax, a taxpayer has to be assessed the tax, pay it, and then seek that the tax be refunded. The penalties for not carrying health insurance don't kick in until 2014, so the argument is whether the penalty associated with not carrying health insurance is a 'tax' or a 'penalty.' If they are a tax, the Supreme Court can't render a decision on the constitutionality of the individual mandate until the penalties for not carrying health insurance are imposed. I like to think of this as the Supreme Court's escape hatch.

The argument over the individual mandate is the big fish in this pond. Congress relied on its powers to regulate interstate economic activity under the Commerce Clause at Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution in passing the individual mandate. The plaintiffs allege that the individual mandate requires individuals to purchase a commercial product, which is a regulation of inactivity rather than economic activity, and is therefore beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. The government argues that the refusal to carry health insurance is economic activity in the sense that in many circumstances a refusal to buy health insurance is effectively a demand by an individual that taxpayers pay their medical bills for them at some point in the future. The argument over the extent of the power granted by the commerce clause is nothing new; anyone who has been to law school is familiar with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which held that growing wheat on one's farm for personal use is not beyond the reach of the power of the federal government under the Commerce Clause. Sharp law students understand Wickard v. Filburn as a demonstration that the judicial branch is subject to and conscious of the relationship between popular opinion and the ability of the courts to exercise their power; less sharp law students fondly remember Wickard v. Filburn as a demonstration that they are smarter and more true to the pure exercise of legal judgment than every member of the U.S. Supreme Court were one day in 1942.

That the Medicare expansion question was granted certiorari surprised me. Specifically, it is only the expansion of Medicaid and not the whole program itself that is being challenged. Medicaid itself appears to be comfortably constitutional as an exercise of the federal government's power to tax and spend under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Complaining that Medicaid is coercive as applied to the states seems similar to complaining that the White House is white; it is true, but constitutionally irrelevant.

Finally, there's the question of the severability of either of the Medicare expansion or the individual mandate from the act. This question only comes up if the court finds that either provision is unconstitutional, but if it does come into play the entire Affordable Care Act hangs in the balance. Effectively, finding that a provision is so essential to the legislative scheme of the Act that the Act cannot function without it is a judicial undoing of the entire piece of legislation. I call this the Scorched Earth Holding. Just a little reminder, the private health insurance market before the Affordable Care Act was not functioning well at all, and indications were that, at least in some states, the marketplace had entered a death spiral. A United States without the Affordable Care Act may well soon become a United States without individual health insurance plans.

My prediction is going to disappoint you--I think SCOTUS might punt on this one. I honestly do not think that Kennedy is willing to strike down the entire Affordable Care Act, and I expect that Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor will vote as a block for the constitutionality of each provision. While we will not be privy to the goings on in chambers, the more liberal wing does have quite a bit of leverage thanks to the severability issue; if any provision looks to have five votes against its constitutionality, they can all sign on to an opinion that the provision is not severable, thereby forcing the more conservative justices to have to go all-in on striking the entire Act down. I think it is worth noting that striking down an act duly passed by the legislature is always an act of judicial activism, regardless of the political stripe of the people supporting the holding.

But, then again, six hours of oral argument is an awful lot of sound and fury if the justices plan to simply reach a politically convenient detente. A decision that disappoints everyone, namely finding that the case can't be heard by virtue of the Anti-Injunction Act, might be the court's only chance at staying above the political fray in an election year; the question is whether the Supreme Court is actually chomping at the bit to dive into the fray full-force. Past practice says no, but the Roberts Court has signaled a willingness to render decisions that have by most measures changed long-standing precedents in American constitutional law (I'm thinking of the decisions in Citizens United v. FEC and District of Columbia v. Heller). Honestly, it's anyone's guess. And that anyone is probably named Anthony Kennedy.

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Ninth Circuit Rules Proposition 8 Unconstitutional Under Rational Basis Review

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By James Bowden

Breaking news out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: a three-judge panel has ruled California's controversial Proposition 8 unconstitutional. The most interesting aspect of the decision is the court's rejection of Proposition 8 as unconstitutional under rational basis review, the lowest standard of constitutional scrutiny: "Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples." That is a benchslap of somewhat epic proportions.

It is possible that review under the highest level of review, strict scrutiny, may have been appropriate here--the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that legislation regulating marriage and procreation "involves one of the basic civil rights of man" in Skinner v. State of Okl, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). No matter, though, as a law found unconstitutional under rational basis review likely wouldn't stand a chance under the strict scrutiny standard.

The defendants in this case may now apply for rehearing en banc or may apply for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Based on the politics surrounding the case, the smart money is on the latter.

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Restitution for Victims of North Carolina's Involuntary Sterilization Program Does Not Mark the End of American Eugenics Laws

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By James Bowden

On Tuesday, a task force in North Carolina concluded that it would request restitution of $50,000 from the North Carolina legislature to each of the estimated 1,500-2,000 living victims of the state's formal 45-year experiment with eugenics. As recently as 1974, people deemed "undesirable" by North Carolina authorities (most often minorities, women, the mentally ill, and the impoverished) were subjected to involuntary sterilization.

This is unfortunately just the last page of one chapter in the history of America's experimenting with the practice of eugenics. Much like the fact that almost 150 years after the ratification of the 13th Amendment the United States still struggles to annihilate human trafficking and slavery within its borders, most Americans are unaware of the history of eugenics and forced sterilization in the United States.

The practice also has a rather dark history with the U.S. Supreme Court, which, when given the opportunity, granted the practice purported constitutionality. In what was almost certainly the worst opinion of his career (and ranking as one of the worst decisions in the history of the Supreme Court, along with the Dred Scott case and Plessy v. Ferguson) Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr. declared that "three generations of imbeciles is enough," upholding the constitutionality of the sterilization of Carrie Buck, a Virginia woman who had been institutionalized as "feeble minded," in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Later scholarship indicates that Carrie had likely been raped by a successful doctor who employed her as his housekeeper and insisted on her being committed to protect himself, was institutionalized by her ne'er do well mother, and received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial from an attorney who had inexcusable conflicts of interest and who may have deliberately lost the case. Nonetheless, Carrie Buck lost her petition before the US Supreme Court in an eight-to-one decision and was sterilized against her will upon her return to Virginia. Her daughter, Emma, whom Holmes regarded as the third generation of imbeciles, was perfectly normal and did well in school. The eugenics expert that recommended Carrie’s sterilization went on to be honored by the Nazis for drafting Germany's "Race Hygiene" law, the direct legal progenitor of the Holocaust.

Following Buck v. Bell, eugenic sterilization laws were passed by an increasing number of states, and by 1956 27 states had sterilization laws on the books. Even after Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) prevented the application of compulsory sterilization to convicted criminals under a statute that excluded white-collar crimes on equal protection grounds, the practice continued. Eugenics fell out of favor in the U.S. after the atrocities committed by the Nazis in the Holocaust and subsequent defenses raised by war criminals at Nuremburg, some of which cited American eugenics practices as evidence of the permissibility of genocide, but the statutes remained on the books across the country. In North Carolina, the practice continued until 1974. Oregon maintained a Board of Social Protection (f/k/a the Oregon Board of Eugenics) until 1983.

Here's the kicker--under existing American constitutional law, forced sterilization is technically constitutional. The most recent case, Poe v. Lynchburg Training School & Hospital, 518 F. Supp 789 (W.D. Va 1981), found that sterilization did not violate constitutional rights.  At least as a technical matter, the law of the land still tolerates the involuntary sterilization of some of the most helpless among us.

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After Successive Legal Victories, Occupy Nashville Holds On Tight

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By James Bowden

The Occupy Wall Street movement looks like it is waning, or at least hibernating for the winter. In New York, Zuccoti Park has been cleared out. The Occupy LA, Occupy Philadelphia, and Occupy Oakland encampments are gone. But if the movement is in retreat, no one told the Occupy Nashville folks camping out on Legislative Plaza, right outside my office doors. Winter is settling in, and over the last week we've had torrential rains and freezing temperatures, but they are still out there every morning when I get to work. Occupy Nashville is holding tight to their spot on Legislative Plaza after several interesting legal twists and turns. Their tenacity may make them a unique outfit within their movement.

Tents sprang up at the foot of the Tennessee State Capital early in October. Later that month, reports of all sorts of not-entirely-legal-or-appropriate behavior led Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam to impose a curfew on Legislative Plaza from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. The curfew was announced the afternoon of October 27th. The Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) arrested protesters early in the morning of October 28th for violating the curfew.

I think it is an understatement to say that it didn't go so well for the Governor and the THP. A Magistrate Judge first refused to hear the charges against the protesters on the grounds that the protesters were not given sufficient notice of the curfew, and released them for lack of probable cause. The THP tried to arrest protesters again at about midnight on October 28th; this time, Metro Night Court Judge Tom Nelson issued an epic benchslap – unable to identify any legal authority for the curfew, he again found no probable cause for their arrest and ordered all arrested protesters released. Release on a finding of no probable cause at arraignment is a very, very rare occurrence. Two in a row? Probably a record. To add insult to injury, the THP was called out for a less-than-covert attempt at infiltrating the encampment. Soon after the arrests, U.S. District Court Judge Aleta Trauger issued an injunction against enforcement of the curfew. A decision isn't expected until February at the earliest, but I expect it to be well read and well reported when it arrives.

So, the Occupy Nashville protesters are still there. I went down and walked around Legislative Plaza after work for a few minutes last night. It is a surprisingly well organized little encampment, with a mess tent, a first aid tent, a front office, and even a "social media" tent. The protesters are perfectly friendly, and happy to talk to anyone who will listen. I hope they stay warm and safe, have happy holidays, and are ready for their hearing next year.

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"I've seen some humdingers, but never any ordinance like this"

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By James Bowden

That’s Mark Hays, General Counsel for the Arkansas Municipal League, reacting to an ordinance passed by the City Council of Gould, Arkansas setting forth with the (supposed) force of law that “No new organizations shall be allowed to exist in the City of Gould without approval from a majority of the City Council” as reported in this New York Times article. This passage of this ordinance is a sort of First Amendment Violation Hat Trick for the Gould City Town Counsel, having recently passed an ordinance requiring that the Gould Citizens Advisory Counsel, a political group based in Gould that seeks to influence how the town is governed, cease to exist, and another prohibiting the mayor from meeting with “any organization in any location inside or outside Gould city limits.” Holy Schnikes.

To be fair, Ms. Sonya Farley, a Gould city councilwoman, has admitted that the ordinance was “worded wrong” and was passed “to treat everybody fairly.” So I’m guessing the offending ordinance will be reworded to somehow do right by the whole “Congress [extended to all state actors, including city councils, by the 14th Amendment] shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” language of the First Amendment. I expect that the Gould City Council’s attorneys will be scratching their head on the work around long into the wee hours of every night, until the end of time.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes and the Economics of Litigation

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By James Bowden

After the American Civil War and the passage of the Civil War Amendments (i.e. the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), instances of discrimination and denials of individual civil rights continued to be institutional practices in the former Confederacy. Victims of these abuses faced a difficult problem: they didn’t generally have access to the assistance of an attorney for assistance. Why not? Attorneys couldn’t afford to take the cases and still feed themselves; the plaintiffs were more often than not penniless and the only legal remedy available was injunctive relief, which meant less than a hill of beans of an economic recovery following even egregious violations of civil rights.

The fix Congress came up with was to pass a statute that changed the economic playing field as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The specific statute, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §1983, allowed plaintiffs to pursue equitable remedies (specifically monetary damages), and the corresponding 42 U.S.C. §1988 allowed for collection of reasonable attorneys’ fees. All of a sudden, taking civil rights plaintiff work made good economic sense.

The case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes et al., 564 U.S. ___ (2011), decided June 20th, centers around a similar tweak to the economics of litigation included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - class action suits as allowed by Rule 23. Class action suits are ideally suited for situations where a person or entity with a disproportionate amount of power (or wealth) injures a large number of generally less powerful (or less wealthy) people and entities, even just a little bit. Instead of requiring each individual to file separately and seek to join a single case, or even litigate an entire claim separately, the class action suit allows a representative or representatives of the class to prosecute the case. The class representatives (and their attorneys, who are most often on a contingency fee arrangement) are rewarded with a percentage of the total settlement and the remainder is doled out to the other class members. While each individual injury probably doesn’t produce an economically viable claim to litigate, aggregating the claims into a single suit allows even minor injustices to yield sufficient enough claims to support the often significant cost of litigation.

The plaintiffs in the Dukes case are three female former employees of Wal-Mart purporting to represent as many as 1.5 million other women who are current and former employees of Wal-Mart, alleging that Wal-Mart has discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. The numbers are staggering, and not just the number of potential plaintiffs: women represent a full 70% of the hourly wage earners employed by Wal-Mart, but only 33% of management, and statistics show female employees as being paid less than men in every region, with the salary gap widening over the course of employment even for men and women hired to perform the same job at the same time. Wal-Mart has an anti-discrimination policy but gives relatively broad latitude to local managers as far as promotion and raises. The plaintiffs claim that the statistical evidence produced indicates that the system of delegated discretion runs afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which bans, among other things, employment discrimination based on sex.

Interestingly, the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas and the dissent written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Stevens, Sotomayor, and Kagan draw heavily from the life work of Vanderbilt’s own Professor Richard Nagareda, and come to different conclusions. The core holding of the majority opinion reverses the opinion of the District Court, upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirement that their grievance share commonality as required by Rule 23(a) essentially because their expert witness could not confirm whether 0.5% or 95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart were the product of stereotyped thinking – and essentially holds that even though some or many of the individual decisions resulting in the disparities noted may be the product of discrimination, some may not, so the commonality of the class is insufficient for certification under Rule 23. The dissent, which is styled as a concurrence but refuses to join the essential holding, briefly points out that the majority opinion substantially limits the “disparate impact” approach to Title VII claims. It really is an opinion worth reading.

The impact of the Dukes on the economics of class action litigation is difficult to discern. In a sense, it is a narrow decision – the majority seems mostly unwilling to allow such a large, nation-wide class to be certified while allowing that Title VII would support such a class-action claim, if the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) were more concretely apparent. Cases where the commonality of the class is objectively apparent – shareholder suits with all of their strange economic incentives come to mind – will carry on, business as usual. But the impact on this particular type of case – in which no explicit policy of discrimination can be pointed to, but the statistical evidence of discrimination is substantial – may be catastrophic. Putative plaintiffs are bringing such cases more and more frequently, using sociologic studies and regression analysis in an attempt to link institutionalized but unofficial discrimination to its observable effects. The majority opinion requires that the analysis of a putative class of litigants include speculation by the court as to how each individual’s claim may have been affected by different influences – what the concurrence (dissent) calls a “dissimilarities” inquiry. The holding is a powerful tool for any defendant to use to parse apart the scope of a class of plaintiffs, and reduce the economic advantage that Rule 23 provides in suits alleging discrimination.

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Follow-Up – Legal Issues Surrounding Release of Photos of the bin Laden Corpse (Sort Of)

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By James Bowden

President Obama, despite what his CIA Chief expected, has decided not to release the pictures of Osama bin Laden’s corpse. Apparently this decision has upset a not-insignificant number of people.

While the decision to release or not to release the pictures are an executive decision and not a legal decision, Congressman Duncan Hunter (R – California) has an interesting [legal] take on the whole thing:
 

               “[The U.S.] should not curb our First Amendment rights because of
                what some crazy people might do.”

Huh? I may not be understanding what Congressman Hunter meant. If he is suggesting that the First Amendment creates some obligation on the part of the U.S. government to release the pictures, I am pretty sure he is incorrect.

The First Amendment creates a negative right in individuals by prohibiting the government from doing two things, specifically (i) making laws with respect to the establishment of religion or restricting the free exercise of such, and (ii) abridging the freedom of speech, the press, peaceable assembly, and petition of the Government for redress of grievances. I’m thinking Congressman Hunter is going for (ii), but there is no application of the First Amendment to the release of the pictures. The First Amendment does not compel any type of speech. So, no, the First Amendment doesn’t have anything to do with it, and Congressman Hunter will have to take Con Law II over again.

But what about a petition filed under the Freedom of Information Act? Could a curious person seek release of the pictures with one of those? Well, that’s probably a dead-end too. The Freedom of Information Act does provide a mechanism to force release of certain documents and records, but also exempts items authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept from the public in the interest of national defense. The scope of this exemption was greatly expanded by President Reagan’s Executive Order 12356 to cover pretty much anything tangentially related to national security; while President Clinton reduced the scope of this order during his presidency, using the Freedom of Information Act to compel release of photographs of the body of a terrorist killed by a highly secretive squad of military professionals during a highly secret mission probably won’t fly. Oh, and if the pictures aren’t considered relevant to national security already, Executive Order 13526 allows the government to classify them as such retroactively.

My guess is eventually the pictures will be revealed, much like the copy of President Obama’s birth certificate. Already, a conspiracy theory is growing – or, more accurately, certain conspiracy theorists are finding a new fixation. What surprises me is that, while the pictures of the deed done are being kept secret, the identity of the deed doers is apparently not. I’d think there would be concern for their safety, but honestly, those guys can probably take pretty good care of themselves.

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Notes on International Criminal Jurisdiction - the bin Laden Raid Edition

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By James Bowden

Once upon a time, during a conflict that similarly spanned a decade, the aggrieved friend of a soldier killed in battle took vengeance upon his friends’ killer in a duel outside the gates of Troy. The vengeance of death was not enough for him, so he tied his victim to his chariot and dragged the body around the city walls before taking the body back to rot without burial. We’ve come a long way since the great warriors of the bronze age. After Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs on Sunday, his body was taken back to a U.S. Navy ship, where it was bathed and a ceremony in Arabic was held before the body was given to the sea all within 24 hours, as required by Muslim tradition.

The raid that resulted in bin Laden’s death was by no means anything but extra-legal, despite some counter-arguments. Pakistan is technically an ally, and was not informed of the mission until it was well in progress. The mission is not without its legally-problematic analogy: in 1960, Israeli Mossad agents captured Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi responsible for the logistics that made the horrific, mechanical efficiency of murder that was the Holocaust possible, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The dispute over Eichmann’s capture led to the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 138, which in effect recognized that Eichmann was an evil guy who deserved his comeuppance, but gingerly noted that Israel’s methods were not altogether on the up-and-up. Israel and Argentina later effectively agreed that, while Israel’s actions had infringed on Argentine sovereignty, seeing as how Eichmann was such a bad guy, no harm, no foul. Eichmann was tried in a civilian court in Israel, found guilty, and executed by hanging. Despite the result, not exactly the precedent you’d want to cite to support the legality of the bin Laden raid.

The war on terror has always been a bit of a slippery legal concept: it is one where the theatre of war is not reasonably limited to certain geographic areas, as a technical matter was never subject to a declaration of war by congressional action, and is not against an easily identifiable opponent. Similarly, there really is no definable victory; there will never be a surrender on the deck of a warship, or a treaty signed in a neutral city. Even more troubling, it appears that information, including the information that led to the discovery of bin Laden, may have been extracted from detainees held without charge by the use of interrogation tactics that were, by most definitions, tantamount to torture.

The issue that may become a minor flashpoint now is that bin Laden will not face trial. It is probably an unnecessary digression to point out that suspects shot and killed by police while resisting arrest are similarly exempt from trial, but some may insist that the mechanism of a trial gives legitimacy to the final disposition of an enemy by providing the gloss that the outcome is not pre-ordained. I’d have to insist the outcome of the trials of war criminals are rarely anything but a forgone conclusion. A very close friend of mine from law school who worked for the Special Court for Sierra Leone once told me that trials for war criminals are necessary as distinguishing between civilization’s respect for the rule of law and the chaotic anarchy that war criminals represent, even if the facts of the case are never in doubt. The trials are mechanisms for applying international law to punish persons who would claim to be immune from prosecution or outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal; the accused person’s immunity or the tribunal’s jurisdiction over them are generally the only disputed issues. In essence, holding trials is the difference between us and them, between due process and the cold injustice of revenge. If bin Laden had been captured, would a trial have been the correct procedure? Undoubtedly, yes, but what intricacies would be necessary to ensure due process is a question we will never have to ask. Perhaps we are fortunate not to be so required.

So bin Laden will not face trial, and will not have an internationally-televised news event to use as a platform to spout propaganda and turn the knife in the hearts of his victim’s families. That fact will likely not only avoid the logistical nightmare that a trial presents and save heartache – it will likely save lives. The night that Achilles killed Hector, Hector’s father Priam, the King of Troy, snuck to Achilles’ tent in disguise to beg for his son’s body, so that it could be buried according to tradition – essential, in the eyes of the Trojans, so that their city’s hero could cross the river Styx and enter the afterlife. Achilles, seeing Hector for the first time as not the murderer of his friend but as a noble opponent, granted Priam’s wish, and Hector was buried a martyr to Troy and dignity, and a symbol of the waste that is war. Osama bin Laden was killed in a pitch battle with the soldiers of his self-declared enemy, who showed him more respect and courtesy in death than he ever showed to a one of them in life. Bin Laden was buried at sea, where his grave will never be a monument and its occupant will never be a martyr.          

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Ho-ray For Pro-Se

Posted by wlansden | Filed under ,
By James Bowden

What goes in Vegas may sue Vegas when it gets home, pro-se. Our hero today, Hubert Blackman, who is clearly a hilarious human being in an ironic, tragic and unintentional way, did not thoroughly enjoy the services he purchased from a member of the world’s oldest profession. Based on the tragicomic complaint that Mr. Blackman filed in Federal Court in the Southern District of New York and an article detailing the event published in the Las Vegas Sun, I’ll try to reconstruct the events that “had gotten happen on December 17, 2010 around 6:50 pm.”

    Mr. Blackman ordered a “stripper” from a periodical styled Las Vegas Exclusive Personals while visiting Las Vegas. The stripper performed traditional stripper services for him, plus a little bit extra (if you know what I mean, wink-wink, nudge-nudge, say no more), for a grand total of $275; following the delivery of services, Mr. Blackman called the escort service to complain that the stripper only stayed for half of the one-hour session and demanded a refund. When rebuffed, he wisely (for our purposes at least) chose to do the irrational thing and call the Las Vegas Police, at which point he “almost had (sic) gotten (sic) arrested.” Because while prostitution may be legal in some parts of Nevada, it certainly is not in Las Vegas.

    This epic vacation fail would have ended there and never made it to this humble blog, except that Mr. Blackman decided that once he was on a roll he shouldn’t  stop, and sued Las Vegas Exclusive Personals on the novel legal theory that “An excort (sic) had did (sic) an illegal sexual act on me during her paid service to me” and “the escort had (sic) broke (sic) the law.” Bravo, Mr. Blackman - Clarence Darrow you are not. Fortunately for the sake of establishing proof, despite there being no witnesses, “Technology acknowledged everything,” whatever that means.

    The damages? Well, a refund. And $1.8 million for “the tragic event that happened.” Perhaps the plaintiff even surprised himself at the size of the punitive damages; he appears to have written the amount in italics. Why does he need $1.8 million? For medical treatment of a psychotic disorder. The compliant implicitly suggests but does not explicitly state whether this disorder preceded the incident.

 

Blackman Complaint.pdf (159.20 kb)

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